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The Contingency of Consciousness 
STEVE MART1NOT 
Berkeley, California 
In the following pages I will discuss a case, necessarily from afar (it 
occurs in the early 19th century), that poses some important questions about 
the way wc understand consciousness, intcntionality, and its precursors in 
the human organism. It suggests that some traditional questions need to be 
replaced, such as the notion of intcntionality in animals, which buttresses 
a hypothetical evolutionary continuity for which human consciousness is 
only a latest, highest form or stage. The presupposition in such questions is 
that consciousness is an innate, biologically necessitated development. On 
this basis, one sets the dividing line between the conscious and the non-
conscious somewhere other than between the human species and others. In 
general, wc naturally tend to set this line further down the ladder because 
wc arc inclined to attribute consciousness to animals to make sense of their 
behavior. But this motivation is doubly unsatisfactory: in it, wc are 
speaking about ourselves, not animals; and however we try to modify the 
definition, consciousness is always consciousness as we understand it in 
ourselves. 
I will argue that the case of Kasper Hauscr gives us an insight into 
what can be called a prc-intcntional state of being. It suggests 1) that, for 
the human organism, consciousness is not "internally" necessitated, but 
"externally" contingent, 2) that what germinates as consciousness finds its 
seedbed in an activity in the world, and 3) that the dividing line between 
the intentional and the non-intentional is wholly within the human 
species itself. That is, grantiOK th*» human physiology and 
neurophysiology is the ground, nevertheless the arena where the drama of 
an emergence and development of consciousness is played out lies beyond it, 
elsewhere—a view which immediately explains why neurophysiology has 
such difficulty demonstrating an experimental link between neural 
processes and intentional states. 
For two reasons, this discussion must necessarily be philosophically 
heuristic. The first is that it is distant. We know of Hauscr only through 
texts. Our data comes to us in the form of narratives. Hauscr's own account 
of himself is imbedded in these narratives, as in a mcta-tcxt. In a sense, 
this narrativity is appropriate, since only narrative permits us to grasp the 
particularity of consciousness, or of the subject. Second, the "data" is not 
repeatable. The inhumanity that led to Hauscr being a "case" in the first 
place shall hopefully never be permissible as a mode of experimental 
investigation. 
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The Case of Kaspcr Hauscr 
When Kaspcr Hauscr appeared in Nuremberg at the end of the 
afternoon of May 26, 1828, he seemed drugged or demented.' He stood 
immobile: silent, blank of expression, acknowledging nothing and no onc--
rcscmbling perhaps a department store mannequin accidentally abandoned 
in the street. Bending slightly forward on stiff legs, he appeared to be 
perpetually off-balance. He held a note in his hand directing the reader to 
take him to the captain of a cavalry unit stationed nearby. When he 
himself was bodily turned in the direction indicated, his unresponsive 
demeanor remained unchanged. From time to time, at random, he would 
utter one of three rote expressions, which appeared to have no meaning for 
him. (285) Only one word of German escaped his lips: "ross" (horse). (Of 
language altogether he knew only two words and his rote expressions.) The 
note stated he was 17 years old. 
At the cavalry stable, he was presented with a variety of foods and 
objects. For a while, he evinced recognition of only two (i.e. his blank, 
uncommunicative attitude was replaced by an expression of mild attention): 
a coin, which he greeted with the word "ross" (286), and a man's bending 
over him. All other people and objects, and all questions, he disregarded as 
if they were non-existent. And when the coin was taken from him, he 
relapsed into immobility and blankncss. But he was neither drugged nor 
demented. When given a piece of paper and a pencil, he seized the pencil 
eagerly and carefully wrote the name "Kaspcr Hauscr" in large script 
across the page And the next day, when presented with a wooden toy 
horse, he eagerly embraced it, as if it were a suddenly encountered island of 
infrangible familiarity in a sea of surrounding alienncss. Did he live in a 
world consisting of only two things, a toy horse, and paper and pencil? 
What kind of blankncss or non-awareness would this be? 
Anselm von Fcucrbach gives the following description of Hauscr's 
personal comportment during his first weeks in Nuremberg. 
1 My primary source is a text by Anselm von Fcucrbach, a biologist and 
criminologist who immersed himself in the case, and wrote extensively 
about it. His most prominent pamphlet is reprinted in Wolf-Children and 
Feral Man by Singh, Rev. J.A.L. and Prof. Robert Zingg (New York: 
Harper, 1942), hereafter cited in the text in parentheses. Certain 
impressionistic descriptions in this essay must also be credited to Werner 
Hcrzog's movie on Kaspcr Hauscr, entitled "Every Man for Himself and 
Cod Against All." Hcrzog is reputed to have done considerable research on 
the case, exploiting sources not immediately available to myself. And 
indeed, on impressions or subjective descriptions, his guess is probably 
better than mine. 
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He seemed to hear without understanding, to see without 
perceiving and to move his feet without knowing how to 
use them for the purpose of walking (284). 
He appeared neither to know nor to suspect where he 
was. He betrayed neither fear nor astonishment, nor 
confusion; he rather showed an almost brutish dullness, 
which either leaves external objects entirely unnoticed, 
or stares at them without thought, and suffers them to 
pass without being effected by them (285-6). 
Some days after his arrival, Casper was conducted . . . 
around the city to discover whether he could recognize 
the gate through which he had entered. But, as might 
have been foreseen, he knew not how to distinguish the 
one from the other; and upon the whole, he appeared to 
take no notice whatsoever of what was passing before his 
eyes. When objects were brought more than ordinarily 
near him, he gazed at them with a stupid look, which, 
only in particular instances, was expressive of curiosity 
and astonishment (295). 
He did, however, reach for things that glittered; and he greeted animals 
with the word "ross," humans with the word "bua." 
Hauscr was temporarily consigned to the police station until his 
history could be ascertained. Examined by a physician, he was found to be 
in adequate health, except for a deformation of his knees; the knee-caps 
had sunk into the joint from undcr-use (a condition partially explained by 
his habit of seating himself on the floor, both legs stretched out straight in 
front of him) (292). His sensibility to the world appeared intact; when he 
reached out to grasp something, he did in fact grasp it. Neither were his 
telexes defective; when attracted by a burning candle, lie stuck hi:, finger 
in the flame and instantly jumped back, withdrawing to a comer of the 
room and whimpering (294). But he seemed to have no sense of danger nor 
awareness of malice. For example: 
Feigned cuts and thrusts were made at him with a naked 
saber, in order to try what might be their effect upon him; 
but he remained immovable, without even winking; nor 
did he seem to harbor the least suspicion that any harm 
could come to him (294). 
Only gradually did his initial absence of awareness dispel itself. For 
instance, though the bells of a church steeple tolled every hour throughout 
the day right outside his police station window, it was only after several 
days that he gave any indication of having heard them, and then only 
because they were pointed out to him by someone (295). 
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In a word, Hauscr appeared naive and "prc-conscious," not unlike an 
infant, a comparison Fcucrbach makes several times. In this respect, 
Hauser fascinated Fcucrbach; he afforded a unique and unprecedented 
opportunity to observe mental development in a fully grown body, 
unclouded by the requirements of infantile biological development. From 
his undoubtedly Romantic point of view, Fcucrbach explained Hauser's 
initial insensibility to the world in the following manner. 
Yet, even with seeing and unblindcd eyes, he would have 
seen nothing; at least he would have observed and taken 
cognizance of nothing. For nature, with all her 
phenomena, must at that time have shone before his 
eyes, with the glare of one confusedly diversified and 
checkered mass, in which no single object could be 
distinguished from another (309). 
That is, for a period of time, nature's richness would have left him in the 
throes of sensory overload. This is reminiscent of William James' remark 
that to a new born baby the world must appear a "blooming, buz/.ing, 
confusion"~a miasmic, undifferentiated background. Hauscr himself was 
later to confirm James' insight, though not Feucrbach's theory of sensory 
overload.2 
Like any child, Hauser learned to speak with great rapidity. Also, 
like a child, once he learned some language, he attributed life to things, 
carrying on one-sided conversations with inanimate objects. He also 
referred to himself in the third person, and spoke with a distorted syntax 
(317). During Hauser's first months in Nuremberg, the mayor of the town, a 
man named Binder, had Hauser brought to him every day for language 
lessons and interrogation. Binder issued an official report on Hauser's 
condition and background on July 7, 1828, in which he constructed the 
following story (304-6)3 As a baby, Hauscr was locked in a cell, whether a 
2 Fcucrbach became Hauser's chief educator and defender against a host of 
detractors. Indeed, controversy surrounded Hauscr from the moment of his 
discovery, including charges that he was a fraud, a spy, and a freak. The 
controversy arose mainly over the question of Hauser's memory. Though 
Hauscr avidly attempted to educate and integrate himself into his new 
cultural environment, the controversy surrounding him made this difficult 
and left him very little peace. After 5 years in Nuremberg, he was 
murdered. A year and half later, Fcucrbach himself died under rather 
strange circumstances, after having hypothesized that Hauser's death was 
in fact a political assassination. 
3 Besides a short autobiographical sketch Hauscr himself was later to 
write which essentially parallels Binder's report, the report is the only 
THE CONTINGENCY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 43 
basement or an attic being unknown, and kept there. He sat on the floor, his 
legs straight out before him, dressed only in pants and a shirt, his feet bare. 
He ate only bread and drank water from a pitcher. He "never saw the face 
of the man" who brought him food, and was not taught to speak any 
language. Periodically, he was drugged via his drinking water, 
presumably with opium, from which state he would awake dressed in clean 
clothes. He was taught to write the name he transcribed that first day in 
the cavalry stable by someone who stood behind him and guided his hand 
over the page. He similarly learned the letters of the alphabet. At times, 
he was left to scribble at will on paper placed before him. During those 
years he had two toy horses to play with and a few ribbons with which to 
decorate them. When brought to Nuremberg, he walked part of the way in 
the company of a man—"the man with whom he had always been." He 
remembered being beaten once by the man (with a stick) for making too 
much noise with his horses (though sword slashes meant nothing to him). 
And that was all he allegedly could recall of 17 years.4 
Hauser's Memory 
The date of Binder's report is important. It was issued only six weeks 
after Hauser's arrival. For Fcucrbach, this raises two questions: first, 
given Hauser's initial state of insensibility, how could have recalled what 
Binder attributed to him? And second, if he initially knew no language at 
document that purports to describe Hauser's existence prior to his 
appearance "in the world." 
4 The case of Genie, which is similar in some respects to Hauscr, might be 
noted here. Ccnie was a girl locked in a small room at age 20 months and 
kept there for 12 years. When finally rescued, in 1970, she was 
malnourished and knew no language. Curtiss, Susan; Genie: A 
Psycholinguists Study of a Modern Day 'Wild Child' (New York: 
Academic Press, 1977). 
Like Hauscr, after a number of weeks, Ccnie showed what her nurses 
called 'stimulus hunger.' There was a three week period between her 
release from her room and her hospitalization, during which time she was 
with her mother and grandmother. At the end of this time, she was still 
malnourished!? (p. 7) She apparently did not become as accomplished 
with language as Hauscr. Like Hauscr, she claimed to recall having been 
beaten by her father, a fact that had, at the time, already been affirmed 
by her mother. But the question of her memory is not really addressed in 
the literature. Curtiss mentions the issue in the same section as an account 
of Genie's foster-father becoming angry at her, and of Genie's development 
of an ability to lie and to tell fantasies. From the point of view of the 
present essay, it is frustrating that this issue should be dealt with in an 
ambiguous manner. 
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all, how could Hauscr have recounted what is reported? Part of Binder's 
account could be the result of deduction. For instance, when first fed, 
Hauser spat out all food and drink except bread or water; this would 
suggest that he had previously known only those two foods and found all 
else strange and unpalatable. At the dinner table, he at first reached for a 
pitcher to drink from, rather than a glass of water placed before him. 
Conclusion: he had previously drunk only from a pitcher. But a deduction 
is not the same as the subject's own memory. Fcucrbach felt it would be a 
serious mistake to attribute to Hauscr what had been, in fact, deduced by 
another. Furthermore, to communicate a feeling, the fact of a clean shirt, 
for instance, or a pain, requires linguistic ability. Even signs and grimaces, 
to the extent they signify interna) states, require previous linguistic 
"definitions," which Hauscr was receiving from Binder. Binder was 
teaching Hauscr the language of his answers at the very moment of 
questioning. 
It is not (Fcucrbach says) an easy matter to discriminate, 
in every particular instance, between what really 
appertains to the person questioned, and what in fact 
belongs to those who questioned him: between what 
really flowed from Casper's obscure recollections, and 
what, by dint of repeated questions, may have been 
insinuated into his mind, in such a manner, as to have 
been involuntarily confounded by him with things 
actually stored up in his memory (303). 
In other words, Fcucrbach suggests that Binder may have been "leading the 
witness," or rather, teaching Hauser his story in the process of teaching 
him how to tell it. 5 
5 Wc encounter an inverted version of this in the case of Genie. In discussing 
Genie's acquisition of language, Curtiss seems to overemphasize the 
quantifiable, what can be tested. According to both Curtiss and Fromkin, 
Genie learned language more slowly than normal children her 
'intellectual' age, though cognitivcly she seemed in some ways to be more 
advanced. They hypothesize a right hemisphere language lateralization. 
Still, they test Genie for competence in correct English syntax and grammar. 
That a different syntax may evolve, perhaps peculiar to right hemisphere 
language, or conditioned by the fact that it is learned in a fully grown body, 
as seen in Hauscr, remains unaddrcsscd. That is, Genie may have learned 
language differently, and thus learned a different language, than normal 
children. It seems that Genie tended to produce syntax rather than learn it 
(Curtiss, p. 193(f). Victoria Fromkin (Brain and Language. Vol 1(1) (1974) 
reports that Gcnic seemed to comprehend all the "WH" words (who, what, 
where, when, why, and how), though she could not use them to produce 
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questions, while normal children at a comparable stage generally 
comprehend the first three, and only later the rest. The difference is that 
the second three require a story or semi-narrative response while the first 
three can be answered nominatively. Is it possible that for Ccnie, words 
were more fully apprehended as events (sec balloon incident, Curtiss, p. 
15)? Also, because Ccnie did not learn to read, her tests involved pictures, 
not only of objects, but of events. A test places "language" in an alien, 
objectified, event structure; it becomes something "out of there." In effect, 
Genie's language acquisition and testing may have moved at cross purposes. 
As Curtiss herself says. The tests indicate one picture, anecdotal evidence 
indicates another" (p. 142). I am reminded of the on-going controversy 
about measuring language deficiency strictly on the basis of 'official* 
English among children from black communities, for instance, ignoring 
above all the syntactical particularities of "Black English." 
One is drawn to the idea that perhaps Curtiss functioned with respect 
to Conic as Binder did to Hauscr; the event structure embedded in learning 
language becomes a component of the language learned. 
Yet even granting the validity of deduction from what Hauscr evinced 
as familiar, some anomalies appear in Binder's account which raise other 
questions about Hauser's memory. Hauscr recalled toy horses, yet he could 
not recall what supported him in a seated position (304). • One would 
imagine that he sat away from the wall, since a person was able to crouch 
behind him to teach him to write. Did he never see his backrest? This 
would imply he never moved about his chamber. Seventeen years spent 
without moving his legs would have resulted in very serious atrophy; yet, 
upon arrival in Nuremberg, he was able to stand and (barely) walk. 
Perhaps he had no backrest, and held his body upright by his own 
strength; would he not "recognize" this as he "recognized" dean shirts? 
And why would he not have sought the support of the wall, and later 
"recalled" that he had done so, as he "evinced familiarity" with the 
pitcher of water? Again, he "remembered" a man bending over him, but he 
couldn't remember the shape of the room, nor if one left it by going up stairs 
or down (or if stairs existed at all). If he could recall that there was a man, 
the "man with whom he had always been," why did he not recognize the 
existence of men in the stable when they gave him a pencil and paper to 
write the name that was his? Finally, he seemed to be somewhat familiar 
with coaches (and he tended to fall asleep as soon as he entered one, as if 
part of an habitual pattern) (309), but he had no recollection of having been 
in one before. Whether Fcuerbach is right or not, there seems to be a 
selective process of recall that transcends Binder's deductions or 
assumptions. If, by "recall", we mean "evince a familiarity by reaching for 
or attending to" rather than ignoring, then wc can say he recalled toy 
horses. Yet this simple act of synonymy makes a perhaps impermissible 
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leap from something knowablc only in a first person sense to a third person 
view of the behavioral. It changes the subject, in both senses of the term. 
Ironically, what rendered Hauscr a celebrity in Nuremberg was 
precisely his capacity to remember. After residing in Nuremberg a while, 
he demonstrated powers of recall for data and detail far beyond the 
capacity (or belief) of those observing him. Visited by thousands of 
strangers during his first year in Nuremberg, he effortlessly remembered 
them all. Fcucrbach reports: 
Whenever any person was introduced, Casper went up 
close to him, regarded him with a staring look, noticed 
every particular part of his face . . . with a penetrating 
glance. He then repeated the name of the person as it 
had been mentioned to him. And he knew the person; and 
. . . he knew him forever (316). 
He remembered all associated personal information, including occupation, 
title, ancestry, address, friends and associates, etc. and whatever stories 
his visitor chose to tell him. His visitors tested him again and again to 
discover when he would forget something, or to expose his devices for such 
accurate recollection, or to catch him revealing some fact from his past. But 
in vain; he never did slip. The opulence and accuracy of his memory 
remained unimpeachable while the details of his past remained buried. 
(After some time, his ability to remember gradually declined until it 
closely approximating that of any other person.) 
Let us add one more clement to this account of Hauser's memory: his 
interest in drawing (319). Because he demonstrated an immediate 
familiarity with paper and pencil, he was given these things to occupy 
hims"!f. After a while, he attempted to train himself to draw. He 
proceeded to i«f/eatcdly copy a painted portrait of the mayor. With cc*.. 
attempt, he arrived at a closer approximation of his model. Considering it 
a serious enterprise, he saved each trial drawing in the order of its 
completion as a record of his progress. He never became really 
accomplished at drawing, but for about a year it held his interest. 
Whatever his eventual skill, however, he never attempted to depict any 
aspect or object of his pre-Nurcmbcrg past. He evidently recalled pitchers 
of water, but he made no attempt to draw the particular pitcher he had 
previously used. The toy horses he had to play with fared no better in 
becoming subjects of his art. Neither did he ever attempt to draw the man 
who brought him to Nuremberg, although he allegedly recalled they had 
walked part of the way, and so would no doubt have seen his overall 
figure, if not his face. 
Did he not remember these images? Or did he perhaps seek to repress 
all recollection of his former incarceration? Though logical, this latter 
possibility docs not seem to be the case. On the contrary, he at first longed 
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for his former existence, for its simplicity and freedom from the struggle 
(though a wholly self-engendered struggle) to learn and to know. He quite 
openly yearned for "the man with whom he had always been" to come and 
take him back again. Yet he drew no pictures of where it was he yearned to 
be. He was constantly surrounded by people extravagantly interested in 
how he had previously lived, yet he could not sufficiently remember a 
concrete image from his past to render it on paper. How arc we to reconcile 
the luxuriance of his memory with the immensity of that absence? 
Could it be that particularities of his imprisonment (his captivity's 
circumstances) got lost in the monotony of a condition approximating 
sensory deprivation? If had grown up under those conditions, in relation to 
what world would they seem monotonous? On the other hand, would not 
his few steps from his cell to a coach, or his walk to Nuremberg have at 
least partially awakened him from his incarceration's effects? And 
wouldn't his toy horses, with their ribbons, have stood out as changing 
elements for him? Though he never drew their picture, he recognized a toy 
horse immediately when it was presented to him. Neither sensory 
deprivation nor sensory overload (an "overload" immediately transcended 
by the toy horse and paper and pencil, for some reason) explain his lack of 
memory. 
All mammals have a memory. Hauser, a mammal, must therefore 
have remembered his first 17 years in some sense. The necessity to rely on 
deduction and interpretation from "evinced familiarity," however, marks 
the absence of a voluntary account. What seems to be at issue is Hauser's 
power of intentional recall. Though he had a mammalian memory, and 
thus a primordial capacity for recognition that rendered certain things 
familiar to him~in the same sense, perhaps, that a cat "evinces a 
familiarity" with a space by resting in it, and not lurking at the edges or 
skulking in its corners-that power appears to have been lacking. And it 
seems to be precisely what flowered extravagantly upon his arrival in 
Nuremberg. Even if we use the notion of intentional recall in a non-thetic 
sense, it still transcends animal memory. For instance, recalling words in 
the midst of conversation occurs without reflection or attention to the 
experience that has bestowed meaning upon the words recalled and spoken 
in the moment. A word is recalled and used intentionally; it is not an 
evinced familiarity. That is, we cannot equate "recall" as an autonomous 
act, as a function of consciousness, with "evinced familiarity," with 
behavior that looks like "recall" when viewed from elsewhere. And it is 
precisely this distinction that thrusts our first questions upon us. 
Docs that mean that intentional recall is not inherent in the human 
organism? If not, then what would mark or make manifest the transition 
from animal memory to intentional recall? In Nuremberg, two glaring 
deficiencies in Hauser's life were filled; he learned language and engaged 
in dialogue with others. Is it possible that the activities of learning 
language and engaging in dialogue arc necessary for intentional recall? 
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There arc two similar examples of feral people who learned language 
upon re-entry into human society, and were successfully socialized: a girl of 
12 (The Girl of Songi) captured in the Champagne region of France in 1731 
(252), and a boy of 5 (christened Ruben) captured in El Salvador in 1933 
(259). Both demonstrated the same memory deficiency concerning their 
former existence, and one (Ruben) developed prodigious powers of recall 
quite similar to Hauser's.6 (Of course, strictly speaking, Hauser cannot be 
6 The term 'feral man' refers to a human organism reared by an animal or by 
its own means in isolation from other humans. It is generally supposed 
that, beyond a certain point, such a life results in degeneration of the 
intellect, and that such people are doomed to dementia. For the most part, 
this has appeared to be the case. Most attempts to integrate "recaptured" 
feral individuals into society have proved fruitless. The cases of the girl 
of Songi, and Ruben, are therefore of singular interest. ("The Wild Boy of 
Aveyron," one of the most celebrated cases in the literature, never learned 
language. Itard, J.M.G., The Wild Boy of Aveyron, New York, 1932.) 
The girl of Songi was a quick, agile person with powerful arms, 
capable of climbing trees very rapidly to escape danger, and able to catch 
small animals and fish with her bare hands when hungry. When attacked 
by a dog, she killed it skillfully with a single blow of a club she carried. 
She was adopted as a resident at the Castle of Songi, and very slowly 
learned to speak. She later became a nun. 
Prof. August Raubcr, in a sketchy biographical report of the girl of 
Songi, states: 
Mile 'lc blanc' (why she is referred to in the masculine is 
not reported) indicates that she began to think only after 
some education. During the entire period which she 
passed in the woods, she almost had known no other 
thoughts but of her sense of her needs and the desire to 
fulfill them. She docs not remember cither her father or 
her mother, or any other person (though she had lived 
with one—SM), or her country. She docs not remember 
having seen houses before (though she had lived in one— 
SM), but holes in the ground and a type of hut which were 
perhaps covered with snow. But she remembers very well 
that she often climbed trees and went hunting for animals 
(which she continued to do long after she became an 
inhabitant of towns-SM). She believed that trees and 
earth had produced her. She also believed that she 
preserved a like memory of the sea or a river and a large 
water animal. 
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considered 'feral.' He was cared for, housed indoors, and protected from 
predators and weather. Unlike these other feral cases, he didn't know 
how to care for himself, and would not have survived in the absence of 
others. With respect to his memory, however, he is not unique.) These 
three cases suggest that, within the spectrum of human realities, a human 
organism devoid of intentional recall, and still capable of surviving, is 
possible. 
Dut wc all have a certain familiarity with the absence of intentional 
recall; it is an outstanding feature of normal infancy. Though recall of 
infantile events is not impossible, it is very difficult, and generally 
requires some external phenomenon—an accidental encounter with a 
catalytic object, or some hypnotic technique (as well as additional, usually 
parental, corroboration)--i.e. 'externally' induced rather than voluntarily 
recollected. When such recall is affected, not only docs it have a timeless 
quality, a mysterious familiarity, but it presents itself larger than life. It 
is commonly supposed that infantile events dominate the personality 
Her recollection of the sea and snow were the source of speculation that she 
was, perhaps, of eskimo descent and had crossed the ocean in a boat, a 
kidnap victim, perhaps, or a stowaway. 
Like the girl of Songi, Ruben was of powerful build and able to travel 
through the thick tropical forests by jumping and swinging from tree to tree. 
He was amazingly agile, and caught fish with his bare hands. Though he 
was afraid of no animals, he did not hunt them for food. After capture, at 
which time he spoke neither Spanish nor any Indian language, he was 
adopted by a schoolmaster and educated. Like Hauser, he had a 
prodigious memory. For example, some months after his capture, he 
overheard a telephone conversation of some length. When it was finished, 
Ruben lifted the telephone receiver and performed a perfect repetition of 
the entire phone call, complete with pauses for the other party's words. 
A report on his condition when captured states: 
. . . and we know from himself that he lived for food on 
shellfish, fruits, and grass, and that he slept in caves and 
trees. He went naked. The animals he knew best were 
the snake, the lizard, and the dog. It is supposed he did 
not know others. Though wc tried to find out if some 
animal fed him, wc did not succeed (p. 256). 
Again wc encounter the inability to recall more than a few generalities 
concerning life before capture, education, and access to language. Personal 
events, especially those of nurture, survival, or origin, arc lost. No stories 
are told of places or circumstances, the learning of survival skills or narrow 
escapes from attack or dangerous situations. In both cases, entire years of 
daily living arc seemingly collapsed into a few details. 
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because they arc, being early, incomparable to anything, and because the 
infant mind, being open, is unreasoning and susceptible. True though this 
might be, the contingency of intentional recall suggests that such events 
achieve their power because, upon recall, they present themselves as alien. 
They arrive by accident, with all the force of reality, atcmporal in a 
temporal world, while the power that induced them remains unknown, 
exterior and indiscernible. They appear as sudden intangibles by which 
the world both confronts and commandeers one's being. 
The Question of Perception 
If the case of Kaspcr Hauser calls into question the innatencss of 
human intentional recall, it also calls into question the innatencss of human 
perception. This is not a farfetched notion, because perception, as opposed 
to primordial sensing (vision as opposed to sight, "touch" as opposed to 
tactile sense), is a cognitive process. All conscious processes require 
memory; recognition, search, articulation, conceptualization, imagination, 
all occur only in terms of what has already occurred, i.e. with an entire 
past on tap. If one removes cognition, search, intention, or intentional recall 
from 'perception,' only sensation is left (and I will borrow the term 
"sensation" temporarily, in spite of its many unfortunate connections and 
connotations, until the conceptual basis has been developed to change it 7). 
It is the awareness of both "object" and "familiarity" itself that 
distinguishes visual perception from sight. 
Fcucrbach recounts two experiences concerning Hauser's perception that 
need to be understood; first, Hauser's own account of his inability to 
perceive, and second, the event of Hauser's first seeing the stars. Referring 
to a moment in 1828, Feuerbach writes: 
I directed Casper to look out of the window, pointing to 
the wide and extensive prospect of a beautiful landscape, 
that presented itself to us in all the glory of summer; and 
I asked him whether what he saw was not very 
beautiful. He obeyed, but instantly drew back, with 
visible horror, exclaiming "ugly, ugly," and then pointing 
to the white wall of his chamber, he said. There is not 
7 Sec, in particular, Merlcau-Ponty's critique of "sensation" in The 
Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith and Forrest Williams 
(New York: Rutlcdgc Kcgan and Paul, 1974), chap. 1. His critique, 
however valuable for an approach to perception, will not be useful for the 
argument being developed here, because it begins precisely with the 
question of intentional discernment and the constitution of objects, which is 
already posterior to what this essay is attempting to address. 
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ugly." To my question, why was it ugly, no other reply 
was made, but "ugly, ugly" (323). 
In 1831, almost three years later, Fcucrbach asked Hauscr about the 
incident. Hauscr replied that he remembered it, and gave the following 
account of his reaction. 
Yes, indeed, what I then saw was very ugly. For when I 
looked at the window, it always appeared to me as if a 
window-shutter had been placed close before my eyes, 
upon which a wall-painter had spattered the contents of 
his brushes, filled with white, green, yellow, and red 
paint, all mingled together. Single things, as I now see 
things, I could not at that time recognize and distinguish 
from each other (322-23). 
Here we have Hauser's own explanation of why he did not recognize the 
gate through which he entered Nuremberg, nor the route taken there; why 
he could draw no pictures of the objects in his cell, nor for many days her 
the steeple bells when they rang outside his window. He could not discern 
individual objects. The static, immobile world presented itself to him 
flatly, a non-spatial, non-dynamic curtain whose entity and entirety were 
one, and whose unity he could not penetrate.8 Sound as well as sights lost 
themselves in the dull roar of objectlcssncss surrounding him. What ht saw 
continuously before him could only resemble background visual "noise" (a 
"blooming buzzing confusion"). As a counter-example, soon after his arrival 
in Nuremberg, he was taken to a military parade, and inadvertently 
placed near the regimental drum. When the drum started, he fell into 
convulsions. Here, perhaps, was a true case of sensory overload, the drum's 
beats being, perhaps, totally unavoidable as "objects." 
The second experience occurred one summer evening in 1829; "his 
instructor (a man named Daumer, who provided him with a foster home) 
showed him, for the first time, the starry heavens" (332). 
Understandably, this appears to be a somewhat aggrandizing statement, 
8This picture should not be surprising to any readers of Merlcau-Ponty, for 
instance. In The Phenomenology of Perception he says: 
It has long been known that during the first nine months 
of life, infants distinguish only globally the colored from 
the colorless. . . . (The distinctions! between warm and 
cold shades, between the 'colored' and the 'non-colored,'. 
. . take the place of color in children;... in the same way 
the 'strange' colors seen by a diseased person cannot be 
identified with any color of the spectrum (p. 29-30). 
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especially in light of Hauser's visual capabilities. When Hauscr first 
arrived in Nuremberg, and for years thereafter, he had extremely acute 
night vision (a common characteristic of 'feral people'). The brightness of 
day he found, in fact, to be quite uncomfortable. He moved with greater 
assurance at night, and was able to discern small objects on the ground or in 
the distance (for instance, raspberries) and identify them. He was able to 
read house numbers at night at a distance of three blocks (334). How is it 
possible that despite his night vision, and despite the fact that the stars 
provided the light that allowed him to sec as if in broad daylight, it was 
not until August, 1829, well over a year after coming to Nuremberg, that he 
saw the stars themselves? 
Yet something of that order is meant, because the sight of the stars, as 
they were pointed out to him, precipitated a profound crisis for him. He 
was at first awestruck, and exclaimed that it was the most beautiful sight 
he had ever seen "in the world." 
At length, standing motionless, with his head bowed 
down, and his eyes staring, he fell into a train of deep 
and serious meditation. When he again recovered his 
recollection, his transport (at seeing the stars) had been 
succeeded by a deep sadness. He sank trembling upon a 
chair, and asked, why that wicked man had kept him 
always locked up, and had never shown him any of these 
beautiful things. He (Casper) has never done him done 
him any harm. He broke into a fit of crying, which 
lasted a long time (332). 
This incident marked a crisis for Hauser because it signified a total 
reversal in Hauser's estimate of his own past. When he first arrived in 
Nuremberg, and for a year thereafter, he felt neither bitterness nor enmity 
toward his unknown former keeper. 
He had no fault to find with 'the man,' except that he 
had not yet come to take him back again, that he had 
never shown him or told him anything of so many 
beautiful things in the world . . . (later) the burgcrmeistcr 
must take him (Hauser) home, and then he will show the 
man what he has learned in the meantime. When I 
expressed my surprise that he should wish to return to 
that abominably bad man; he replied with mild 
indignation, 'Man not bad, man me no bad done' (32). 
As if by an umbilicus, his every attitude seemed tied to his unrcmombcrcd 
years sequestered somewhere else. And in urgently seeking to educate 
himself, he was not making up for lost time, but preparing to impress the 
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9 Mcrlcau-Ponly's continuation on this question (sec note 7) is apropos here. 
Psychologists would concede her- m o r e than that 
ignorance o r the confusion of names prevents the child 
from dis t inguishing c o l o r s . T h e child must , it w a s 
al leged, s e c green where it is; all he w a s failing to d o 
was to pay attention and apprehend his o w n phenomi .ia. 
. . . T h e psychologists w e r e not yet able to conce ive a 
world in which colors w e r e indeterminate , o r a color 
which was not a precise quality. The first perception of 
colors . . . is a change of the structure of consciousness (p . 
2 9 - 3 0 ) . 
Oliver Sacks offers a reverse confirmation of M c r l c a u - P o n t y in The 
New York Review of Hooks, Nov. 20 , 1987. It is an account of a painter w h o 
lost the ability to perceive color after an accident, and s a w the world in a 
kind of high contrast 4-lorte range of black, g r a y , and white . The odd, 
inexplicable aspect of the c a s e is lhat it a p p e a r e d to be . .eurologrcal , 
though nothing seemed lo be w r o n g with the patient's eyes ; the patient 
m a n w h o would return s o m e d a y lo reclaim him. He stales, in an official 
court report, taken October 182H, that he still felt he was happier in his 
former existence than out in the world in which he "suffered." 
At least, this w a s his attitude until the moment in question, a moment 
which caused him to reinvent his own story of his former existence. T h e 
profundity of his reaction clearly marks the experience as a 'first' of s o m e 
kind. It could not h a v e been a first aesthet ic e x p e r i e n c e . F c u c r b a c h 
mentions his negat ive aesthetic responses to n a t u r e o n several occasions. 
Neither could it have been a first application o f a aesthetic appreciation 
(perhaps upon Daumer 's reference) lo previous exper ience of the stars, for 
he is reported as making special discovery and notice of the brightest s tars , 
and of their differences in color. W e are left with the conclusion that prior 
to this event, H a u s c r had not perceived the stars at all, in spite of the fact 
thai he must have 'seen' them, given that he saw by them. And the 'event' 
itself consisted of their being pointed out to him by another and named. 
It is astonishing to think that perception too m a y be contingent in the 
human organism, that there m a y be such a thing as an a w a k e , unblinded, 
yet unpercciving human being. Yet Hauser 's inability to recognize the gate 
t h r o u g h which he had entered the t o w n , his a p p a r e n t u n a w a r e n c s s of 
objects shown him, the fact that for days he did nol hear the bells ringing 
outside his police station window, and his not having seen the stars, all 
suggest thai it is not sufficient that an object present itself to a h u m a n 
organism for it to be perceived, but that certain pre-condi t ions must be 
satisfied. The organism must be prepared or h a v e prepared itself in s o m e 
w a y . 9 
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Fcucrbach himself would have disagreed with this interpretation. 
For him, Hauscr had been "asleep" for 17 years, and "awakened" only 
slowly, neither seeing nor hearing due to sensory overload. He attributed 
Hauser's non-discernment of individual objects, his recoil from a summer 
landscape to Nature's panoply as a "confused and checkered mass." 
However, wc would have trouble applying such an explanation to Hauser's 
non-encounter with the stars. The stars, after all, arc discrete points of 
light, especially clear to anyone with night vision, and set against a 
uniform non-interfering, non-distracting background. Yet, Hauscr saw them 
no better. Furthermore, by positing "sensory overload," Fcucrbach is 
assuming that there is an innate apprehension of the world to become 
overloaded. Feuerbach could not divorce himself from the notion that 
consciousi. .-ss was at all times present though dormant in Hauscr. That is, 
Hauser was already intentional. Hauser's dysfunctional memory stands in 
the way of such an explanation. 
As an alternative, one could hypothesize an elaborate structure of 
repression to explain the paucity of Hauser's memory, given the alleged 
dircness and oppressiveness of Hauser's former situation. But to posit 
repression as a psychological defense mechanism is to go in the wrong 
direction, for it assumes an even more complex innate consciousness and 
psychological structure than that needed to explain perception. While 
"repression" might explain the slow "awakening" of his powers of 
pcrceptioi, it is contradicted by his enthusiastic recognition of three 
diverse objects his first day "in the world." 
Jerome Bruner gives a synopsis of perception that confirms our present 
interpretation when he says: 
Basically, perceiving involves a three-step cycle. 
Analytically, wc may say that perceiving begins with an 
expectancy or hypothesis we not only sec but look for, 
not only hear, but listen to. In short, perceiving lakes 
place in a tuned organism. . . . What evokes a 
hypothesis? Any given hypothesis results from the 
arousal of central cognitive and motivational processes by 
dreamt and imagined only in black and white after his accident, and could 
no longer remember what color "looked like." While the neurological 
aspect is deduced, it is clearly a "change in the structure of consciousness" 
backward. 
With respect to Hauscr, one could say that something had not yet 
changed the "structure of his consciousness" to the point where he was able 
to "attend" to his "own phenomena." It is indeed not the existence of the 
name that is in question. The question we wish to address here is, a change 
of the structure of consciousness from what? Or is it in fact the birth of a 
structure of consciousness that is in question? 
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1 0 Bruner, Jerome; Beyond the Information Given ( N e w York : Norton , 1973) , 
p. 91 . 
1 1 T h o m a s Kuhn reflects a search for the same kind of account of perception 
when he says, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago : Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1979) : 
S u r v e y i n g the rich e x p e r i m e n t a l l i terature . . . o n e 
suspects that something like a p a r a d i g m is prerequisi te 
to perception itself. W h a t man sees d e p e n d s both upon 
what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-
conceptual e x p e r i e n c e has taught him to s e c . In the 
absence of such training (my emphasis) there can only be, 
in William J a m e s ' phrase, "a bloomin' buzy.in' confusion." 
(p. 113) 
But Kuhn cannot permit himself lo accept perception as contingent, though 
he suggests that is the logic of his a rgument . This is mainly because he 
makes an incomplete distinction between sensory experience and perception. 
For Kuhn, sensory experience is also paradigm dependent, (p . 126) 
p r e c e d i n g e n v i r o n m e n t a l s l a t e s of a f f a i r s ( m y 
e m p h a s i s ) . ' 0 
('Information input' from the environment constitutes the second step, and 
I he third involves checking or confirmation p r o c e d u r e s . ) On Bruncr ' s 
account, not only is perception the result of an attention that is a l r e a d y 
intentional (a search component based on former familiarity or need) , but 
one perceives with a past that recognizes through re-presentat ion of that 
past (a self-verification of the perceived object) . Information input (what 
is actually "seen") is thus surrounded by cognitive processes. If perception 
implies that the object must a l ready h a v e o r be a meaning, then it must 
h a v e received that meaning from prior e x p e r i e n c e . P c r c i Mion is an 
evaluative process for which m e m o r y is prerequisite; that is, m e m o r y is 
the essential medium (though not the means) through which the organism 
is ' tuned' to p e r c e i v e . 1 1 A separation of perception and m e m o r y is not 
possible. To claim Hauscr to be deficient in perception is not only to r e m o v e 
the notions of meaning and cognition from the picture, but to confirm the 
absence of intentional recall. 
A Theory of the Pre-intcnlional 
What a r c the overall implications of this? All c o n s c i o u s processes 
require memory ; if intentionality consists of an attention to its object even in 
the a b s e n c e of that object , then recall of its ( i n t e n t i o n a l ) object 
intentionally lies at the core of it. An absence of intentional recall implies 
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a state of being, albeit human, devoid of consciousness. If "tuning" the 
organism constitutes what Mcrlcau-Ponty calls a "change in the structure of 
consciousness," what it changes from wc must consider, on this account, a 
prc-intcntional state of being. How are wc to apprehend such a prc-
intcntional state? 
Memory, it appears, is the medium whereby the organism is tuned (and 
we might recall here that Hauser's memory burgeoned and matured more 
rapidly than his powers of perception). If so, then the means whereby 
intentional recall is developed would lie at the center of the organism's 
"tuning," as the central factor in the constitution of intcntionality.1 2 
Hauser's biological being, developed though dcsocializcd, neither 
burgeoned coevally, nor stood in the way. If we must look for 'external' 
processes or activities as the means of "tuning," we are led to the fact that 
he learned language and engaged in dialogue with others, that things were 
pointed out to him and named. Is it language and dialogue that "tunc" the 
human organism to perceive the world? 1 3 Or are wc confronted with 
something more primordial than language, something from which language 
itself develops? We would have to immediately discount the name itself; 
how would a pre-intcntional being perceive it as a name? What leads us to 
language seems to obviate the role of language per se in the very same 
movement. Indeed, how would a prc-intcntional state of being enable an 
organism to encounter any means whereby it 'tuned' itself, if it could not 
perceive them? 
Let us return to Binder's report (and Fcucrbach's critique of it). Could 
Binder determine that there had been a "man with whom he had always 
been" without teaching Hauser the language to state that fact? But what 
would the word "always" mean to someone with no past, someone for whom 
time had just begun? 1 4 Hauser's answer to a question concerning time or "a 
1 2 The notion of an acquired power of intentional recall is not what Bruncr 
had in mind in positing the notion of a 'tuned' organism; he is speaking in 
greater generality. Wc might note that when Mcrlcau-Ponty speaks of the 
primacy of perception (The Primacy of Perception, Northwest Univ. Press, 
1964), he is already assuming just such a tuned organism. And even if wc 
accept that both intentional recall and perception develop coevally, the 
former is already the "medium" of the latter, the source of its temporality. 
1 3 This is a different, more basic notion than the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis, 
for instance. The latter claims that world-view is determined by language, 
or that the form of language determines the content of thought. That is a 
different discussion, however. My reading of the Hauscr case does not 
concern what determines thought, but only what is the condition for it. 
i* What makes conceptualization of Hauser's plight bearable is the 
realization that temporality existed for him no more than perception. 
When he <*wokc in Nuremberg, it was without a sense of the duration of his 
previous 17 years. 
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man" would represent his arrival at naming only his present sense of them 
for himself. Hauser 's future cognizance would thenceforth b e only of the 
idea of this " m a n " and " a l w a y s " as c o m e upon in himself w h e n first 
named—that is, the recent past of having learned the te rms , and not the 
distant past lo which they refer. Otherwise stated, his future n g n i z a n c c 
would be of the real moment of alleged recognition, ra ther than the real 
antecedent in an alleged past.1-1"' Thus, each term Binder taught H a u s c r 
would n a m e both the referent and its recognition as being o n e a n d the s a m e . 
" T h e m a n " w o u l d a l r e a d y be f a c e l e s s a b s t r a c t M a n , a n a m e 
indistinguishable from his recognition of o n e bending o v e r him his first 
d a y . Whether Hauscr had ever 'seen' another face before, he would never 
have perceived another h u m a n face. A face w o u l d b e lost in the flat 
spattering of colors and shapes, as were the houses and trees beyond the 
Oliver Sacks provides a supplementary example in Awakenings ( N e w 
York: Dutlon, 1 9 8 3 ) : an encephalitic patient (Parkinsonism) in a s ta te 
"virtually motionless and speechless." 
She g a v e the impression of an infinite remoteness . She 
s e e m e d to d w e l l in s o m e u n i m a g i n a b l y s tra , g e , 
inaccessible ultimity, in s o m e bottomless d e e p hole o r 
abyss of being; she seemed crushed into an infinitely 
dense, inescapable stale. 
W h e n a d m i n i s t e r e d L - D O P A , h o w e v e r , a f t e r t w e n t y y e a r s o f 
molionlessncss, she "jumped to her feet, and before incredulous eyes walked 
the length of the ward . 'What d o you think of that, eh?" she exclaimed in 
a loud, excited voice ." That is, alter years of molionlessncss , there had 
been no a t rophy . Sacks explains this (using 'explains' loosely) b y noting 
that "her standstills had no subjective duration whatever. T h e r e w a s no 
elapsing of l ime." 
Only t h r o u g h such cons idera t ions , fantast ic a s they 
seemed to m e at first, could I comprehend how Hester w a s 
able lo r e s u m e normal activity after y e a r s of inactivity, 
in contrast to an 'ontologically normal' person w h o would 
lose or 'forget' action patterns over a length of lime. 
1 5 In this regard , o n e of Prof . Kaubcr 's s ta tements is interesting. T h e 
ic rminology he uses concerning the Girl of Songi is: "She believed she 
preserved a m e m o r y o f . . . " As an oulsidc observer, Kauber is construing her 
report of her own awareness, a report given in a language others had taught 
her, and through whose terminology only was she enabled to articulate o r 
express that awareness . Kauber is not reporting the fact that she is unsure 
of her m e m o r y (its veraci ty) , but that her m e m o r y is a s tory of alien 
experience which she appropriates as her o w n belief. 
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window Fcucrbach led him to that summer's day. Other men would simply 
present themselves to him as one man whose face would have remained 
indiscernible to him against its owner's bulk. His non-acknowledgement of 
people and objects, being of a piece, indicate that even the one "abstract 
man" would be beyond his experience until the day one brought him to 
Nuremberg. 
All Binder had to go on were the deductions which he. Binder, would 
name Binder was thus providing conjectural interpretations for Hauser's 
"evinced familiarities" and alleged recollections. In this manner. Binder's 
language instruction would necessarily condition the content of Hauser's 
responses in the direction of Binder's interpretations of Hauser's possible 
past (possible for Binder). Binder's instruction would transform itself into 
knowledge for Binder himself as well as for Hauser. Hauscr would come 
upon his recognitions and recollections at the very moment they were 
created for him by being noticed and named by Binder. For Hauscr, there 
would be no other truth, and nothing quite as absolute, as the story Binder 
was essentially writing for him. (This isn't the 'power of suggestion;' it is 
more akin to what we might experience as subliminal influence.) 
Fcuerbach's skepticism, in warning about Binder's generating too much 
recall in Hauser, i.e. of interpretively reporting Hauscr as recalling more 
than he actually did or was able to, appears to be justified. 
If Binder had to have been doing something more than naming, since 
the absence of perception would leave the name itself unperceived, Hauscr 
must also have been participating beyond providing the "evinced 
familiarities" on which Binder would meditate; there must have been 
some reality to his recognitions. Let us turn to the categories Binder was 
able to create to tell Hauser's story. A more basic question awaits us than 
the question of language. 
It makes sense that Hauser accepted or rejected certain foods according 
to the familiarity of their taste or texture, an absence of familiarity 
inducing rejection of the food as an alien substance. Similarly, wc may 
conclude with Binder that Hauser drank from a pitcher in his unknown 
chamber, as suggested by Hauser's "evinced familiarity" with pitchers. 
The pitcher at the dinner table would "recall" the pitcher in his cell, and 
he would drink from it as he had before. But even if wc admit that the 
external object induced recall of past experience with that object 
("recognition" nanifesting itself as particular, comportment), then he must 
have discerned that object as individuated at some point in the past, and 
not as part of a 'spattered screen.' If he discerned the pitcher at the dinner 
table, when he reached for the pitcher rather than the glass of water, 
because he had previously discerned the pitcher in his cell, the question 
becomes, how did he earlier discern the pitcher? What individuated it for 
him against the 'spattered screen' of his cell? What constituted that 
modicum of perceptive power in the absence of intentional recall? 
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Let us establish a horizon of discourse in the everyday. A n y o n e w h o 
has watched a squirrel leap through the branches of trees must marvel at 
its prevision of motion and balance, especially since its eyes are laterally 
placed like a bird's, without s tercoscopy. One's natural a t t i tude is t o 
attribute sensitive p o w e r s of perception lo the squirrel. Because o u r o w n 
intcntionality locates us (or rather embeds us) in a sea of objects, we tend to 
a p p r e h e n d a n y other being that e m p l o y s o r applies itself lo objects as 
"iniendtng" them in a similar w a y . But Hauser 's slory suggests we must 
restrain this tendency. W c cannot seriously contemplate altribi ing greater 
sensory a c u m e n to the squirrel than to H a u s c r , since H a u s c r is a m o r e 
c o m p l e x mammal—and H a u s c r reports to us that the world a p p e a r e d lo 
him as a spat tered screen before his eyes . On the o ther h a n d , o u r 
explanation of a squirrel's precise discernment of branches must also be 
applicable to H a u s c r without contradicting his o w n first-hand a c c o u n t . 
Aflcr all, w c cannot simply a s s u m e animals a r e p r o g r a m m e d machines—a 
cat 's "cur ios i ty" a n d a squirrel's " caut iousness" would be difficult to 
explain . And finally, neither sensing nor percept ion a r c expla inable 
slatting simply form the'spattered screen" phenomenon. A notion of sensing 
must be d e v e l o p e d that renders Hauser 's initial s tate intelligible with 
respect to what we know of animals. (Exempt from this discussion will be 
the sense of smell , a chemical sense that is m o r e primordial , and thus 
requiring of a different treatment, lhan sight, hearing, etc.) 
Gregory Batcson has given a synopsis of the necessity of mot ion for 
sight and touch, which is not a new idea . ' * Line, shape, texture , e tc . a r c 
discerned because the organism's motion presents them as distinction. Line, 
for instance, is de tec ted because the eye vibrates slightly, causing the 
image of the line—an interface between zones of different colors or shades— 
to pass o v e r a succession of retinal cells. Similarly, one discerns texture by 
moving a finger o v e r a surface, by stroking, or by pressing d o w n slightly. 
Distinction is delected as a difference between t w o states into which the 
organism places itself. T h e unchanging is imperceptible unless w e are 
willing lo m o v e relative to il" (Batcson, 107) . If o n e could actually rest a 
hand molionlessly on a surface, cloth would be indistinguishable f rom 
smoolh plastic! A n d conversely , one is a l w a y s electrified v/hen o n e 
unexpectedly touches something alive—it has its o w n vibrations. 
As I look about this r o o m , I see a plenitude of objects—a table, a 
telephone, a cushion on the sofa—all of which are quite familiar to m e . 
Nothing c o m m a n d s my attention as being ext raordinary . If I m o v e m y 
head, I see these objects m o v e with respect to each other, and c h a n g e 
minutely in their o w n particular aspects . But, unless I pay attention to lhat 
motion, it goes totally unnoticed when I inadvertently shift m y position. 
That is, the body's sensory-oriented motions generally g o undetected; the 
vibrations of Ihe e y e s a r e no m o r e discernible to the individual than 
I* Batcson, Gregory : Mind and Nature ( N e w York: Bantam, 1980) , p. 106-8. 
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vibrations of the eyes arc no more discernible to the individual than 
duodenal peristalsis. And even if one were able to rest a hand 
mottonlcssly, sight would recognize the cloth, and maintain its texture for 
the hand. That is, for the intentional being, a certain permanence, a 
temporality is given; these objects do not change at all for me under my 
shifts of position or sensory mode. 
Now, suppose I were as Hauser, and looked at this room. What would 
it mean that 1 saw it as a spattering of colors before my eyes? Although my 
eye vibrations might enable me to discern lines, and the boundaries between 
color-zones, 1 would discern no objects. They would have no permanence for 
me, and their existence would be as atemporal as Hauser's first 17 years. 
Then, my every shift of position would amount to a revelation; the seeming 
motion of objects with respect to each other would be what rendered each 
discernible. That is, my motion would be my ever instantaneous 
prcsentatk-1 of each object to myself against whatever sat behind it. 
Such a strict dependence on motion is evident in the behavior of 
animals. *. cat will raise and lower its head slightly a few times before 
jumping from the floor to a table, a motion permitting the cat to better 
estimate the distance and configuration of the table's edge. Similarly, it 
will wiggle its body back and forth, giving its head a sideways motion, 
before pouncing on a ball of paper sitting on the floor, a motion which 
renders the ball discernible to the cat's "spattered screen." But when 
stalking a squirrel, which is always moving, twitching its tail or turning in 
one direction or another, the cat docs not waste its energy wiggling; it 
merely creeps closer or leaps without hesitation. Conversely, when the cat 
is still, only motion seems to catch its eye; that which is unmoving is 
ignored. 
In effect, the ontological foundation for sensation is the autonomy of 
organismic activity; it is not resident in the objecthood of what is 
discerned. What is "sensed" is not a stimulus that besets the organism, but 
a response, instead, by the world to the organism's autonomy. The "object" 
besets the organism as a stimulus only when the object itself moves 
autonomously. 
Now wc are ready to replace the term "sensation." It is unsatisfactory 
because it pertains to the stimulus-response paradigm. But wc have 
inverted that here. The organism docs not respond to the world as stimulus; 
the organism acts and the world responds. And its actions manifest a total 
capability and involvement.17 "Sense reception" would be a better term; it 
1 7 The term "sense-data" is also unsatisfactory. If a non-perceptual state is 
possible, objects arc not automatically discernible as individuated. The 
notion of sense-data assumes a priori that objects naturally stand out 
disccrnibly as a necessary concomitant to their providing information about 
themselves. The data contained in sense-data is not dependent upon 
'seeing' but upon perceiving, which is an intentional process. Furthermore, 
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sugges ts that the organism receives the wor ld ' s r e s p o n s e to its ( t h e 
organism's) actions besetting the world. It will signify the general horizon 
within which discernment of an object against a background can take place. 
Thus , w c could say that a cat 's meander ings , its z i g - z a g s through the 
world, its curiosity, constitute the very foundation of pure sense reception, 
the separat ion of objects as figures against the world's background that 
make them discernible to the cat. 
In general , this means that the object and the organism stand in n o 
formal o r apriori relation. The motion that permits discernment of the 
object for the organism docs so because it makes the object that organism's 
event. Whether the organism moves, or the object moves , or both, an object 
becomes an object only in so far as it becomes an event for the organism. In 
the absence of being an event, the object remains indiscernible, lost on the 
spattered screen of the visual field. In other words , an object docs not exist 
objectively, an immutable form that presents itself to sight. It par takes 
only in a background uniformity from which distinctions d o not e m e r g e 
autonomously. T h e object is discerned as separate from the background only 
with respect to the w a y motion presents it as separate . T h e o r g a n i s m ' s 
motion, its manner , is thus as much a determinant of the object sensed a s the 
pure form of the object itself. There is a style to discernment. 
In these terms, the visual abilities of the squirrel b e c o m e explainable. 
The world in which the squirrel m o v e s is presented to it by the squirrel's 
motion itself. A branch of a tree is discerned instantaneously as a branch by 
the very approach of the squirrel to that branch; for the unmoving squirrel, 
on this account , the branch would sink into the background. What a p p e a r s 
a w e s o m e to us to w h o m all distinguishable facets of objects a r e a l w a y s 
present, is the speed with which such discernment and distance judgment 
must o c c u r to the squirrel in the midst of its leaps and scampers o v e r the 
tree's branches . O u r philosophical discernment will not keep p a c e with 
Ihe instantaneous mid-leap discernment of the animal. 
Though motion provides a different foundation for sense reception of an 
object, it d o c s yet not consti tute it. A s instantaneous, each revelation of 
particularity to the animal would also be only momentary . T h e m o m e n t 
bodily motions cease , all would devolve back to background uniformity , 
again a p a t c h w o r k of colors. It is precisely the atemporali ly of this state 
that precludes calling it awareness , o r intcntionality; it is prc-intcntional 
precisely because each cessation of motion engenders a 'disappearance ' of 
all objecthood, and each renewal of motion is a lways the first a p p e a r a n c e 
of all objects. Their i m p c r m a n e n c e and rebirth is all that constitutes them 
in the absence of intentional r e c a l l . 1 8 Yet, the question before us is not only 
if s e n s c - d a l a is informat ion- laden , it o b v i a t e s the necessi ty that the 
organism be "tuned" to read it, and not s imply sec it. 
1 8 W e c a n m a k e this m o r e expl ic i t in p h e n o m c n o l o g i c a l t e r m s . 
Intcntionality is not s imply a relation to the world. All objects a r c in a 
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how Hauscr discerned objects, however momentarily, but how he also 
recognized them within that momentary discernment. Between 
discernment induced by the organism, and recognition induced by the object 
(recalling itself as that object, or calling forth an "evinced recognition" as a 
response to its own response to Hauser's discerning motions), a process of 
individuation must occur, still at a prc-intcntional level. The question of 
individuation is the question of what raises a particular object above a 
background of now discerned objects that has replaced the 'spattered 
screen.' What makes Hauser's pitcher an object he can reach for in his cell, 
and reach for again among the plenitude of objects on the jailkcepcr's 
dinner tabic? If he doesn't drink from it every time he "sees' it, what is it 
that he reaches for when he does? 
If the object itself moves, its motion, its own peculiar event-ness, 
already subducts it from its static background; its autonomous style 
individuates it. It besets the organism as an individual event. A man 
moving up to Hauscr and bending over him constitutes such an event, 
something that would present itself as familiar to him later; men standing 
and talking across the room would not. The pitcher, on the other hand, is 
given motion by Hauser himself. He moves the water pitcher to his lips, 
and his own motion renders it an individual event. One teaches a baby to 
feed itself by putting a spoon in its hand, dipping the spoon in its food, and 
moving it then to the baby's mouth. Hauscr in fact explained that he at 
first distinguished between a picture of an object and the object (for 
instance, something triangular and a drawn triangle) by feeling them (323). 
On the other hand, he did not drink from the pitcher every time he 
saw it, or so we may assume. Animals, as prc-intcntional organisms, don't 
tend to gluttony or neurotic eating. If he drank only when thirsty, then his 
thirst must constitute a component of individuating discernment. Once the 
baby "knows how** to eat, its hunger recalls the "know how" of that action, 
and it reaches, first for the food, and later for the spoon. Hauser's 
individuating motion, the act of raising the pitcher and drinking, is that 
through which his thirst manifests itself. Though Hauscr discern the 
pitcher each time he moves, he would recognize it only through the 
individuating necessity to drink. If his individuation of the pitcher 
includes his thirst as a component, then his thirst, an "external" sense 
reception, becomes what induces recall of the act of grasping the pitcher 
and moving it, recall of the act of drinking, the act which individuated it 
relation to a world, but it is a relation of indifference. As Brcntano pointed 
out, consciousness is characterized by a special relation, one of attention to, 
of an importance of the object, a dircctcdncss. Or as Merlcau-Ponty 
emphasized, in The Phenomenology of Perception, the central question of 
perception is how consciousness constitutes the object for itself. 
Atcmporality obviates attention, dircctcdncss, the constituting of the 
object-in short, intcntionality is not a possibility. 
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as pure sense reception. (To fully explicate how it docs that will require a 
theory of memory that space docs not permit to be developed here.) A 
squirrel renders recallable its buried cache of food by land marking it, or 
"mapping" it, in the terrain, which terrain and location is recognized 
through the squirrel's individuating hunger. The instrumentality of the 
act of food burial, which individuates the cache and its terrain, becomes 
the content of recall induced by the ("external") internal state that besets 
the squirrel as hunger (analogous, perhaps, to what wc humans experience 
as a "taste in the mouth"). That is, smell, taste, sound, texture, hunger, 
anger, etc. arc all factors that would serve to individuate an object or 
location. Out of Hauser's hand, or apart from his thirst, the pitcher would 
lose its individuated quality and become part of the shutter spattered with 
paint that was his world. In the absence of a thirst, we could no longer say 
that he saw the pitcher standing near him at all as he sat there on the 
floor of his cell, any more than he seemed to see the people observing and 
speaking to him in the stable. Though it momentarily emerge from the 
surrounding miasma when he moved his head, the pitcher would 
immediately sink back, unrecognized. The absence of thirst changes the 
style by which the pitcher is discerned. The same is true, of course, of 
intentional beings. A glass of water for one who is not thirsty is a different 
object than for one who is (though conceptual evaluation may render them 
the same). 
In sum, sense reception and primordial recognition can not be considered 
as cither strictly neural processes or innate behavioral patterns. Not only 
is an activity always involved, but there is at all times an involvement of 
the entire organism. The organism's motions or somatic statessbecome' the 
objects of the world by being the means of their individuation. 
Finally, wc would have to conclude that Hauscr drew no pictures of 
the pitcher because, in its motionless "still-life" state, it disappeared 
cvcntlcssly from his vision, unappropriated by his eyes and unrecognized 
after years of instantaneous discernment. To be drawn, the unmoving 
pitcher would have to be more than an event he presented to himself from 
time to time through his own motions. Later, in the police station, when he 
thirsted, and discerned a pitcher before him, he reached for it, moved it 
toward him, and drank in full utilization of both the event that constituted 
the pitcher, and the activity toward the pitcher that constituted both its 
individuation and the act of drinking. But even his thirst failed to recall 
an image of that original pitcher for him to draw. It would recall only the 
motions that rendered the pitcher his individual event. Similarly, in his 
cell he pushed a toy horse back and forth on the floor and decorated it with 
ribbons; but even the word * horse' did not later lead him to draw its picture. 
In Binder's report, everything that Hauscr managed to "recall" can be 
understood in terms of its event hood for him, and through the recreation of 
that event in Nuremberg. The pitcher, his name, the toy horse with its 
ribbons, arc all events. He remembered a man, "the man with whom he 
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had always been;" a man entering his cell is pure event. So is a man 
helping him ->ut of the cell, and travelling with him to Nuremberg to 
desert him somewhere on the street. Out stairs would be beyond encounter. 
One would surmise that, given the state of his knees, the presence of stairs 
would probably necessitate his being carried. If that were the case, 
whatever stairs he might negotiate in Nuremberg would be similar to no 
activity of his own from his past, and thus, would induce recall of nothing. 
And how would he be able to distinguish faces, or to render the face of this 
man a face with features and expressions? What motions would the face 
make, beyond its changes of expression, that would more than 
instantaneously differentiate it from the integral entity of "person"? All 
humans would be, upon his entry in Nuremberg, one human. Perhaps the 
face would have to kiss him, or speak. Above all, the face would have to 
have a name. Only after he began learning names could he distinguish 
different persons by peering into their faces, and repeating the name given. 
And at that moment, his memory flourished beyond belief. 
Summary 
Not hard conclusions, but only affirmations are to be drawn from this 
heuristic discussion. But it suggests that our attitude toward intcntionality 
should be changed somewhat. First, it is possible for the human organism 
to live without consciousness or intcntionality, and survive; consciousness is 
neither inherent nor essential for the human organism. Consciousness is 
also not an innate quality of the mammalian brain or of human brain size 
(although brain size is probably a necessary condition for consciousness); it 
is contingent on other factors and activities. Among these activities wc 
must posit speech, and hence a form of dialogue, that both precedes and 
engenders the semantics of language (that is, speech as activity rather 
than as linguistic representation). This must be reiterated; at the level of 
the prcintcntional we are speaking of speech as possible individuating 
event, and not as linguistic object to be perceived. Second, wc do not find the 
evolutionary stages of development of human mental capability, 
consciousness, and intcntionality, between the human species and other non-
human species (missing or non-missing links). Those stages lie within the 
human and arc self-generating. Third, wc must recall that the first two 
incidents of recognition Hauscr evinced in Nuremberg, incidents that 
themselves outline the profundity of his lack of attention to everything 
else, both involved names. When he recognized the coin that first day, it 
was only in terms of that for which he had a name. He did not see the stars 
until they were named for him. This raises a multitude of questions. 
While it would be illogical, within the argument given here, that the 
name was necessary for perception of the object it names, since that only 
begs how the name is perceived, wc arc confronted with the question of 
what is peculiar about the act of naming that it might play such a 
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revelatory role. In the account given here, can wc consider Hauser's thirst 
to be a primordial form of the act of naming? Is a dialogue about the object, 
as a particular unfolding of events, even though it restrict itself to the mere 
name, necessary for perception of the object? Is the name for the object in 
actuality a name for the dialogue that constitutes an individuation of the 
object? Is dialogue, even at the primordial level of the act of naming, the 
milieu through which consciousness is self-generating? Not only docs this 
discussion raise these questions, it suggests they have affirmative 
answers.19 
But now, how are wc to understand the transformation of speech as 
event to speech as linguistic object. This discussion changes the 
fundamental questions confronting a theory of language. First, we must 
discount the notion that language is hereditary based on the fact that feral 
people raised by animals lose their ability to learn language.20 Second, if 
intentional recall and perception occur in the human organism only in 
association with language and social interaction, we have what Dcrrida 
calls a chiasmus. How can language partake in the foundation of 
intentional recall, in order to provide for the cognitive aspects of 
perception, if those same cognitive aspects are essential for the emergence 
of language in the first place? This, now, is the problem for the theory of 
language; if the human organism is innately pre-intcntional, and language 
and dialogue arc perhaps the critical ingredients necessary for the 
generation of intentional recall, how docs language emerge from the three 
identifiable aspects of the prc-intcntional state (induced recall, motion, 
and sense reception), such that it engenders signification at the same time 
that it engenders both itself and the autonomy/spontaneity that underlies 
signification? 
And these three phases? How are they related? At the prc-
intcntional level arc they still separate, or do they constitute a unity? 
How arc wc to grasp that? We can envision Hauser seated in his cell, legs 
straight out before him, his back leaning against . . . something. When he 
feels hungry, he reaches over and picks up his loaf of bread from where he 
1 9 The question of this transformation, of an ontological foundation for 
language, as well as its pre-cognitive forms, are addressed by me in an 
unpublished manuscript entitled The Word and the Echo, whose central 
thesis is that the peculiarly human capability of speech is both the 
necessary and the sufficient condition for the existence of consciousness. 
2 0 Sec in particular the case of Amala and Kamala (in Singh and Zingg), 
two girls raised by wolves who, after being captured, resisted both 
language and walking upright on two legs. In addition, the two girls seem 
not to have begun to develop even a wolfish language between them. This 
case suggests that a form of socialization results from being -cared by 
animals that blocks any future human socialization—which poses a big 
question for the notion of linguistic inherency. 
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had left it. His hunger recalls for him the eating of bread, biting and 
chewing. He moves the loaf now in his hand before his eyes to find a place 
where the crust juts out, where it will be easier to bite. The motion exposes 
the topography of the bread, the irregularities in the crust left by his 
former bites. He sees them. These motions arc all things he has done 
before. 
Each motion he makes contains the memory of a former motion, of a 
motion consequent only upon other similar moments of his life. Each 
recalled former motion, each induced and momentary recognition occurs 
upon encounter with a previously encountered manifestation of the world: 
an object, n event, or a process of his own physiology. Each of the world's 
aspects that he senses comes to him through a motion: its own or his own 
transformation of its stillness into his event. He recalls because of his sense 
receptions. He moves because he recalls his former motions, remembering 
"how* to make them. He sees or feels the objects of his world because he 
moves, and thereby presents them to himself, each individuating 
movement momentarily raising a particular figure in relief against a 
background. Thus, each aspect of his being only manifests what is given to 
it by a preceding aspect. Recall manifests itself as motion, activity; motion 
manifests itself as sense reception; sense reception manifests itself as recall. 
At the prc-intcntional level, sense reception, induced recall, and motion arc 
inseparable. That is, each aspect of this cycle has been stripped of its 
content; it occurs without the content that wc as intentional beings would 
find within it. Each phase only establishes the next one, the one it calls 
into existence, as its content. Sense reception leads to recall which leads to 
motion; motion leads to sense reception which leads to recall. The cycle 
goes around and around. There is neither awareness nor necessity in this 
picture, nor is there temporality, without which perception or any other 
aspect of consciousness is unimaginable. The world that surrounds Hauser 
encounters only his indifference, as it did his first week in Nuremberg when 
he toured the city with dull, staring, uncurious cycs.H That is, there is no 
21 With respect to Hauscr' initial exprcssionlessness, wc might add the 
following. In The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1987) Oliver Sacks speaks of a woman who lost her 
proprioception to polyneuritis. She regained her mobility by using her eyes 
to monitor her movements. Yet she regained no facial expression. "Her face 
. . . still tended to remain somewhat flat and expressionless (though her 
inner emotions were of full and normal intensity), due to lack of 
proprioceptive facial tone and posture" (p. 50). In effect, facial expression 
is itself an intcntionality. 
Another facet of this is added by Curtiss. She states that when first 
hospitalized, Ccnic "did not react to temperature, heat or cold" (Curtiss, 
1977, p. 9). She further notes, without comment, that the 'wolf girls' (sec 
note 17) and the Wild Boy of Avcyron "also displayed this imperviousness 
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difference between himself and this "world;" he has no attention to give it, 
to constitute it with. For Hauscr, in his cell, seventeen years go by this 
way. I l.uiscr was not asleep before Nuremberg; he didn't exist. 
Finally, if consciousness is contingent, then language must be also. For 
neither is there necessity nor inherency.22 The ontological foundation of 
language must lie elsewhere than in the realm of communication or 
expression, since both presuppose intcntionality with respect to content and 
to the intention to communicate or express that content. If that foundation 
is to be sought in the cycle of sense reception, induced recall, and motion, 
and in the means of transformation of the pre-intcntional, i.e. in speech 
activity and speech interaction, then to articulate or conceptualize the 
realm of that transformation should be the first step for any theory of 
language. Dut if language reflects that transformation itself, then 
language becomes the ontological foundation for what language itself is 
about. 
to temperature." That is, whether the individuals spend their "feral 
period" indoors or outdoors, they evince this common characteristic of non-
awareness. 
2 2 The question of the innatcness of language, of course, is pre-empted by the 
non-innatcness of intentional recall. There is the additional question of the 
innatcness of the capacity for language, which Chomsky raises, among 
others. In general, the idea has a certain desperation about it, from the 
need to postulate something. Dut it is trivial if, by 'capacity,' one means 
something akin to the capacity to walk upright. On the other hand, if one 
means more than that, then the wolf children and the Wild Boy of Avcron 
present counter-examples. 
